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Model-Based Human-Centered Task Automation:
A Case Study in ACC System Design
Michael A. Goodrich and Erwin R. Boer

Abstract—Engineers, business managers, and governments are
increasingly aware of the importance and difficulty of integrating
technology and humans. The presence of technology can enhance
human comfort, efficiency, and safety, but the absence of humanfactors analysis can lead to uncomfortable, inefficient, and unsafe
systems. Systematic human-centered design requires a basic understanding of how humans generate and manage tasks. A very
useful model of human behavior generation can be obtained by recognizing the task-specific role of mental models in not only guiding
execution of skills but also managing initiation and termination of
these skills. By identifying the human operator’s mental models
and using them as templates for automating different tasks, we experimentally support the hypothesis that natural and safe interaction between human operator and automation is facilitated by
this model-based human-centered approach. The design of adaptive cruise control (ACC) systems is used as a case study in the
design of model-based task automation systems. Such designs include identifying ecologically appropriate perceptual states, identifying perceptual triggering events for managing transitions between skilled behaviors, and coordinating the actions of automation and operator.
Index Terms—Human-centered automation, mental models, satisficing.

I. INTRODUCTION

W

ITH the rapid progress of technology, there is a concerted effort to use automated systems to augment
human abilities in safety critical tasks such as automobile driving, aviation, and process automation. However, a
lesson learned from process automation is that, in the absence of human factors considerations, even technologically
state-of-the-art systems can be more problematic than beneficial [1], [27], [32]. This lesson indicates the importance of
including human factors in the automation design process so as
to prevent “ironies of automation” [1].
Human-centered automation is a magnificent ideal, but one
that is difficult to achieve in practice. One reason for this difficulty is that much of human-factors analysis produces case-specific phenomenological data, that is, data reporting trends and
correlations but without plausible explanations of cause and effect. This compels the individual designer to make subjective
predictions and conjectures and this, in turn, causes human-centered design to often be more of an art than a science.

Manuscript received October 29, 1999; revised April 23, 2003. This paper
was recommended by Associate Editor A. Ollero.
M. A. Goodrich is with the Computer Science Department, Brigham Young
University, Provo, UT, USA.
Erwin R. Boer is with Consulting, San Diego, CA, 92037 USA.
This work was researched while the authors were with Nissan Cambridge
Basic Research, Cambridge, MA, 02139 USA.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TSMCA.2003.817040

As an alternative to case-specific, phenomenology-based design, an integrated model of human behavior-generation allows
a designer to expand attention to include not only how human
operators behave, but also why they do so. Such a model must
not only reflect human processing, perception, and behavioral
characteristics, but also facilitate accurate predictions and descriptions of human behavior (particularly the potential behavioral modifications triggered by the introduction of automation)
[3], [5]. With the availability of an integrated model, the designer is in a position to construct theory-guided experiments
and model-guided designs.
From our experimental work, as well as from human factors
literature, we can identify some important factors influencing
the perceived safety and usefulness of automation systems. In
particular, the following four factors influence how humans use
automation design to support and/or take over certain aspects of
skilled human behavior.
1) Limitations: Automation should safely and reliably operate within its intended limits, and these limits should be
easily identifiable and interpretable by human operators.1
2) Responsibility: The transfer of authority between human
and automation should be seamless, meaning neither the
operator nor the automation should be required to work
outside the limits of their operation. Additionally, the operator should know who does what work and when.
3) Dynamics: The dynamic execution behavior of automation systems should be acceptable2 to and predictable by
human operators under all conditions.3
4) Efficiency: The automation should perform skilled execution more efficiently than the operator and thereby
relieve the operator of some of the physical and mental
burden of performing the task. Additionally, operation of
the system should impose minimal workload.
When these human-centered design principles are practiced, the
human operator is more likely to effectively interact with the
automation.
This paper is written from a perspective that task automation
systems, defined in the next section, are intended to safely

1This is associated with the notion of transparency in the literature. However,
transparency seems to capture the notion that humans should be able to use automation without expending a lot of cognitive effort. In this context, each of the
four factors presented herein contribute to the transparency of the automation.
2Acceptance by operators implies that the automation performs the task sufficiently well and that the operator can control the automation.
3Transitions associated with dynamic task allocation should be acceptable
and predictable by operators. We choose to include elements of dynamic task
allocation under limitations rather than dynamics.
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A. Skill Initiation

Fig. 1. Timeline of transitions between human operator and automation
control. (Time increases from left to right.) The timeline indicates who is
given authority to execute a skilled behavior to accomplish a particular task.
Automation authority begins at an initiation event, and ends at a termination
event.

promote operator comfort and system usability. In an environment where automation and human share responsibility, safety
and performance are enhanced when both parties derive their
actions and decisions from a common ground. Such a common
ground can be established by creating automation controllers
that a) choose control via perception-based control [2], [4] and
b) present operator information in an ecologically-appropriate
way [6], [9]–[12]. To this end, we create a computational framework of human-machine interaction using multiple dynamic
mental model agents who coordinate skilled perception-based
control mechanisms to generate satisficing4 behavior. These
dynamics include discrete switching as well as continuous
control. They characterize the transitions between human and
machine control as well as dynamics within the operator’s
cognition itself, but do not (in this paper) include learning
and adaptation. They also characterize dynamic execution of
skilled behavior as performed by the automation and the human
operator.
Throughout the paper, we will make extensive use of equations and abbreviations. The following list summarizes the most
frequently used notation:
1) KB, RB, and SB: knowledge base, rule base, and skill
base;
2) SR, TR, BA: speed regulation, time-headway regulation,
and active braking;
: state, action, and consequence;
3)
4)
: accuracy metric, liability metric, and satisficing set.
II. AUTOMATION TAXONOMY
Human interaction with automation follows the timeline diagrammed in Fig. 1. Initiation and termination of automation
are functions of human desires and capabilities on the one hand,
and machine design and capabilities on the other hand. Thus, the
usefulness of an automation system is a function of both the operator’s understanding of the dynamic machine-environment interaction as well as the operator’s understanding of the automation. An automated system must facilitate not only seamless
transitions between automated and human skills, but also unambiguous assignment of responsibility for switching between
these skills. Effectual operator understanding is facilitated by
designing automation systems compatible with human attentional, perceptual-motor, motivational, and cognitive characteristics.
4The term satisfice was used by Simon to denote the notion of being “good
enough.” The etymology of the word is unclear to the authors; some references
state that it is an old Scottish word, and other references state that it is a composition of the words satisfy and suffice.

Sheridan identifies ten levels of automation in human-computer decision-making on a responsibility spectrum ranging
from the operator deciding on a task and assigning it to the
computer, to the computer deciding on a task and performing
the task without input from the operator [16]. Based on these
two extremes, automation that shares responsibility with
a human operator can be broadly classified into two main
categories:
1) Task Automation Systems: The operator chooses to delegate skilled task execution to the automation to relieve some
physical or mental burden. Conventional and adaptive cruise
control are examples of task automation systems.
2) Response Automation Systems: The automation preempts human decision making and control and initiates skilled
task execution to facilitate safety or efficiency. Collision
avoidance warnings and interventions are examples of response
automation systems.
The essential distinction between these two categories is how
the automation is initiated and, more precisely, who invokes the
automation. In the first, the human operator initiates the automation whereas in the second, automation initiates itself.
B. Skill Execution
After the automation is initiated, it proceeds to perform its
assigned skilled task execution. The manner in which the automation executes this skill is important since some execution
schemes are more compatible with operator understanding than
others. Moreover, if the task can be performed manually by the
operator, then the operator may have preferences in how the task
is executed; these preferences influence the operator’s expectations for automated skilled task execution and therefore the
transparency of the automation. It is desirable for the automation
to perform the task in a way that conforms to the operator’s expectations and preferences, and that is amenable to interruption.
Remaining “in the loop” requires being attentive and having accurate and reliable expectations of the skilled-behavior of the
automation.
C. Skill Termination
Automation will terminate if the assigned task is completed
or if the human operator intervenes. Since completion and intervention can both occur, it is important to design task automation systems that help operators detect and respond to the
limits of the automation. This observation leads to a second division among automation types. This division is exemplified by
Sarter’s automation policies [29].
1) Management by Exception: When operators can easily
detect and respond to the limits of automation, then the automation, once initiated, is responsible for system behavior unless
and until the operator detects an exception to nominal system
behavior and terminates the automation. Examples of this termination policy include conventional and adaptive cruise control.
2) Management by Consent: When the limits of automated
behaviors are not easily identifiable by operators, then the automation, once initiated, must convey its limits to the operator
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and clearly indicate when it terminates itself. This allows the operator to develop accurate and reliable expectations of automation termination by consenting to a limited scope of automated
behavior. Examples of this termination policy include timed devices and systems that perform a task with a clearly identifiable
state of completion (e.g., lane change, parking, and emergency
stopping).
The essential distinction between these two classes is how
the automation is terminated and, more precisely, who turns off
the automation. In the first (automation by exception), people
terminate the automation whereas in the second (automation by
consent) the automation terminates itself.
D. Transitions
While driving an automobile, many of us have had the following experiences:
1) We have been maintaining a safe but fast speed when suddenly traffic slows and we are forced to switch from a
“speed regulation” behavior to a “stop and go” behavior.
Such a switch is mandated by the change in the environment.
2) We have been contentedly following another vehicle for
a long time when we suddenly decide that we should
pass. We discretionarily choose to switch from a “car following” skill to an “overtaking” skill.
In the process of coordinating behavioral skills, there are discretionary switches between behaviors and mandatory switches
between behaviors. Mandatory switches result from nature
“forcing” a principal agent5 (defined as either the operator
or the automation) to change its behavior, and discretionary
switches result when nature “affords” an alternate behavior
which may be more desirable and the principal agent decides
whether to change or not.
When a principal agent is operating in a natural environment,
there will be times when both mandatory and discretionary
behavior switches may occur. These behavior switches are
examples of the more general forced and suggested behavior
switches that emerge from the interaction between principal
agents. When the operator is performing skilled task execution,
the automation can suggest a change in behavior by generating
a warning or informing the operator of a (in the automation’s
opinion) superior alternative, and the automation can force a
change in behavior by intervening in system control or blocking
operator actions. When the automation is in control, the operator can suggest a change in behavior by requesting a service
or giving input, and the operator can force a change in behavior
by terminating the automation or otherwise intervening.6

5Rather than using the term agent, we use the term principal agent to refer
to the operator and the automation because the former term is used to refer to
mental model agents.
6The distinction between mandatory and discretionary switches is also important in the design of decision support systems which form a significant component of high level task automation [20].
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Fig. 2. Working specification of a mental model. In the figure, arrows mean
influence so, for example, an arrow running from the sensor-perception block
implies that the mental model affects perception while at the same time
perception affects the mental model.

III. MODEL OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR GENERATION: MULTIPLE
DYNAMIC MENTAL MODELS
A human operator interprets and responds to sensory input according to the context established by a mental model7 through
task-specific filtering of the external world [17] and [21]. The
operator must map environmental cues onto selected activities;
an efficient way to perform this mapping is to employ a task-specific pattern of activities, and then implement these skills when
appropriate (i.e., when “afforded” by the environment [6] and
[24]). In this context, the term activity means the operator’s actions on the system (e.g., an activity is pushing the brake pedal
or turning the steering wheel), and the term skill means a learned
sequence of operator activities. Within the overall context of
goal-directed behavior generation, tasks can be defined and corresponding skills can be identified that may be used to accomplish the task (depending on conditions in the environment).
Thus, behavior generation is organized into behavioral quanta
that correspond to separate mental models8 each with their own
perceptually delineated operational domain. In this section, we
present a framework of human behavior generation that can be
used in the model-based design of human-centered automation.
A. Multiple Mental Models
A mental model is an internal mechanism employed to encode, predict, and evaluate the consequences of perceived and
intended changes to the operator’s current state within the dyis a triplet
namic environment. Formally, a mental model
consisting of the following:
1) perceived state of the environment ;
2) set of decisions or actions ;
3) set of ordered consequences that result from choosing
when
obtains.
According to this specification, a mental model not only enand the
codes the relation between the input-action pair
7Note that some behaviors are describable by the stimulus-response model
found in behaviorist literature. Such behaviors are described as autonomous,
meaning that they are performed without any intervening cognitive processes,
such as those associated with a mental model. We adopt the perspective in [25]
which questions the existence of sophisticated autonomous behaviors and instead suggests that those behaviors which appear autonomous have some intervening cognitive influence, albeit a minimal influence because executing the
behaviors is very efficient. Thus, the multiple mental model approach can be
used as an abstraction of autonomous behaviors too.
8Our proposed model complements Wickens’ model of information processing [31]. The model proposed herein can be viewed as an elaboration of
how working memory, long-term memory, and response selection interact.
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predicted consequence , but also induces an evaluation of preferences (i.e., an ordering) among consequences (see Fig. 2).
This mapping and evaluation of consequences depends on the
driver’s own mental and physical state, so the mental model subsumes these important elements of decision-making. The mental
provides the context for meaningfully assessing senmodel
sory information and generating purposeful behavior.
Based on limited attentional resources in human operators,
human behavior generation can be described using multiple
mental models (treated as agents) which can be organized into
a society of interacting agents [21]. This societal structure not
only determines which agents contribute to operator behavior,
but also which agents can employ attentional resources. A
three-level [3], [28] multiresolutional society of interacting
mental models organized into a hierarchical structure can be
constructed corresponding to Rasmussen’s knowledge-based
(KB), rule-based (RB), and skill-based (SB) behaviors [26],
[30]. At the KB-level of this hierarchy, the agent role is supervisory; at the RB-level, the agent role is task management;
and at the SB-level, the agent role is skilled task execution.
Intuitively speaking, the KB, RB, and SB agents think, monitor,
and control, respectively.
can be enabled/disabled and enEach mental model
is enabled the mental model is
gaged/disengaged. When
actively influencing human behavior generation, and when
disabled the mental model has no direct influence upon
behavior. When engaged the mental model holds attention9
whereby environmental information is actively perceived and
interpreted, and when disengaged the mental model releases
attention hence no such active perception occurs. In terms
of Fig. 2, the mental model is enabled if the arcs between
the mental model and behavior/actuation are active (hence,
behavior is actuated) and the mental model is engaged if the
arcs between the mental model and sensor/perception are active
(hence is actively perceived). Based on evidence that humans
can monitor without controlling and control without attending,
need not be enabled to be engaged, nor
we suppose that
conversely. Switching from one skill to another (terminating
one skill and initiating another) requires a fluency in enabling,
disabling, engaging, and disengaging mental model agents.
Depending on the adopted model for attentional limitations
(e.g., single channel or limited resources), multiple mental
models may (under conditions of limited resources) or may not
(under conditions of single channel attention) be engaged.
Discussion of KB agents is an area of future research (and
is more relevant to a discussion of cognitive decision aids than
to a discussion of task and response automation). RB agents
are responsible for detecting perceptual triggering events, operationally defined as perceived conditions mandating a switch
in behavior, and evoking an appropriate response. They do so
by managing SB agents and determining which SB behaviors
are acceptable for the given environment. RB agents may also
monitor the SB agents and discretionarily switch to another skill
9Attentional sharing is necessary because operators have limited computational and memory resources. A simple attentional model schedules attention
between agents. More realistic models for attention are an area of future research. We refer the reader to [3], [8] for more about the role of attention in this
process.

when this is appropriate. The role of an SB agent is to execute
a perception-based control law that performs the task specified
by the RB agent. The remainder of this section elaborates on
how RB and SB agents can be modeled using cognitively plausible descriptions of decision-making and perceptual-feasible
descriptions of control, respectively.
B. Rules: Skill Transitions
Since each task may have multiple skills that can accomplish
the task for different environmental circumstances, successful
task completion requires skills to be managed. Satisficing decision theory (SDT) [13], [14], which employs and compares
two evaluation functions similar to the way benefit and cost are
compared in economics literature, is an ideal tool to describe operator management of multiple skills. In SDT, preferences over
consequences are partitioned into a generalized type of benefit
called accuracy meaning conformity to a standard, and a generalized type of cost called liability meaning susceptibility or
exposure to something undesirable. In our mental model context, recall that denotes the set of possible decisions or actions and denotes the set of possible perceptual states.10 For
and for each perceptual state
,a
each decision
consequence results which is the effect of making decision
when nature is in state . The accuracy
and
functions are preference relations
liability
defined for each consequence (i.e., action/state-of-nature pair).
All consequences which are more accurate than liable are acceptable [14], [15], from whence we can define the satisficing
where is a design
set as
parameter that we leave unspecified here but identify in experiments.
Given SDT, we can restrict attention to those states which
are satisficing for a given , and those skills which are satisficing given the state of nature, respectively defined as
and
. In terms of behavior management by an operator,
is being used to produce behavior. The
suppose a skill
no change is necoperator monitors , and when
, the current behavior is not
essary. However, when
acceptable and must be terminated, and a behavior that is appropriate for the circumstances must be initiated. Given the mandatory need to terminate or the discretionary choice to terminate a
, including
skilled behavior , any skilled behavior
automated behaviors, can be initiated.
C. Skills: Perception-Based Dynamics and Control
Skills can be emulated by closed-loop controllers that operate
on environmental cues. These cues must be perceptually plausible meaning that operators must be able to sense them. For example, automobiles drivers performing the speed management
task can use vehicle speed , time headway , and time to
) as percollision (or, equivalently, inverse time to collision
ceptually feasible perceptual cues [10].
10A perceptual state is more general than a perceived state. A perceived state
includes those ecologically valid states that are immediately observable from
the environment, but a perceptual state includes both immediately observable
ecological states as well as some history of what has been observed in the past.
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System dynamics can be represented using classical Newtonian dynamics with a corresponding dynamic state vector
that, depending upon the actions of the operator A and the acand , respectively), can
tions of a disturbance B (denoted
be described as a discrete time dynamical system to describe
how the state changes over time (indexed by ) yielding
. Shifting focus from a world centered
(i.e., Newtonian physics) perspective to a human-centered
perspective (i.e., perception-based dynamics), we construct a
model of skilled behavior using a discrete time dynamical state
space representation that possesses the following five desirable
features:
Feature 1: perceptual state variables , possibly different
from , are perceivable by the operator;
Feature 2: the space spanned by (denoted
) equals
;
Feature 3: an internal dynamical model of perceptual state
can be contransitions
structed ( denotes the dynamical response in
space , and denotes the related dynamical response in space );
Feature 4: a control law
can be constructed
from the internal model and the observed perceptual state using cognitively plausible decision
mechanisms;
Feature 5: decision planes can be described in a low dimen(i.e., decisions depend
sional subspace of
on relatively few variables).
These five desirable features are satisfied by the multiple mental
model framework. This framework satisfies Features 1–3 because correct mental models are perceptual state-based representations of how consequences evolve in the real world. Furthermore, the multiple mental models perspective allows some
mental models to act at the skill level (thereby satisficing Feature 4) and others to act at the rule level (thereby satisficing Feature 5).
D. Relevance to Task Automation
By restricting attention to task automation, we limit the set
of problems that we address to those in which the operator discretionarily initiates the automation; see [7], [9] for a discussion of human-centered response automation. In the remainder
of this paper, we focus attention on task execution and task termination. In this section, we relate the multiple mental model
framework to the task automation problem. We begin by discussing how skill management impacts the termination policy
of task automation, and then discuss how the execution scheme
impacts the comfort and usability of the automation.
represent the skilled be1) Skill Management: Let
havior executed by the automation. Since the automation has
limitations, there exist a set of environmental states that support automation (i.e., that are within the operational limits of
the automation); thus, we can identify the set
. Given an environmental state and
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skilled operator behavior , the operator can discretionarily ter.
minate and initiate the automation only if
In making the transition from automated to manual behavior,
. Since operators
a switch is mandated when
are situated in the environment and thereby experience a dynamic system, the state is dynamic. The transition from
to
is the perceptual triggering
event that mandates automation termination. This perceptual
triggering event is naturally detected in manual operation provided11 that the appropriate perceptual cues are receiving attention.
We are now in a position to state the first hypothesis for desirable human-centered automation.
2) Hypothesis 1: Mandatory Termination of Task Automation: Assuming receives attention, switches from automated
to operator control via operator intervention are easiest for the
such that
operator if there exists a
. In words, if the limits of automation correspond
to the limits of a subset of natural operator skills, then the limits
of the automation are most likely to be perceived and detected
by the operator.
The motivation for this hypothesis is related to the multiple
mental model framework outlined in previous sections. The operator has an understanding of how his or her own skills should
be used (i.e., experienced operators are good at managing their
own skills) and, more precisely, when and how mandatory
termination should occur.12 Task automation then becomes a
means wherein the operator delegates to the automation the
responsibility for actuating the skill. The operator thus disables
their own perceptual skills (i.e., an SB agent is disabled), but
continues to monitor the world hence the operator’s appropriate mental models are engaged (i.e., a disabled SB agent
is engaged). Thus, the operator is able to attend to relevant
perceptual cues (although they may not do so) and, using these
cues, assess and understand the limits of the automation. This
understanding translates into accurate and reliable expectations
of the automation’s abilities, and these expectations facilitate
effective automation termination under the management by
exception policy. In essence, the hypothesis states that when
the automation matches a subset of the operator’s skill set then
the operator can detect the operational limits of the automation.
3) Skill Execution: The second hypothesis is relevant when
either the operator needs to estimate the current system state,
such as when the system may need to be interrupted, or when
the operator experiences physical dynamics as a result of executing a skill (e.g., feeling forces when an automobile decelerates). Since operators use perceptual skills (or other afforded behaviors) to operate the system, then the system should emulate
the operator in some sense if the system is to supplant operator
11There are two factors that influence the detection of a perceptual triggering
event. The first is attention to appropriate perceptual cues. The second is the
ability to integrate those cues into an assessable description of the limits of
system behavior. For experienced operators, most cognitive mistakes are characterized by lack of attention rather than the ability to assess perceptual triggering
events.
12Mandatory termination does not always occur when it should. Under conditions of stress, fatigue, etc., humans may experience cognitive tunnel vision
wherein a single task or limited set of tasks consumes all cognitive resources.
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control. Design of such emulation-based automation can help
ensure that the operator is both comfortable with system operation and confident in his or her ability to efficiently and safely
terminate the automation.
4) Hypothesis 2: Dynamics of Task Execution: Assuming
that a particular skill is appropriate for a given context, operators
are more likely to understand and prefer automation controllers
that emulate human perception-based dynamics.
Stated simply, if operators perform a skill correctly and efficiently then the system dynamics should mimic the operator.
Doing so helps the operator develop reasonable expectations
and/or allows the operator to experience comfortable system dynamics.
The motivation for this hypothesis is related to the nature of
human perception. We assume that either the operator has experience in performing the skill or will experience physical forces
when the skill is performed. In either case, the operator generates expectations about how the automation will behave and
how such behavior will impact the operator. If these expectations are difficult to generate, then the operator will perceive
the automation as either a capricious companion or a companion
that should not be questioned. No matter which opinion of the
automation is held, it is clear that mismatched expectations will
defeat the purpose of human-machine cooperation [22]. Given
that expectations are so important, we note that it can be difficult, or impossible, to generate accurate expectations if the operator cannot associate environmental cues that are perceivable by
humans with the actual automation behavior. Human-centered
design is based in this observation; it is important for automation to respect how humans perceive the environment and act
in a way that facilitates reasonable expectations. These expectations are best managed when the operating range of the automation is aligned with the human operator, and when automated
execution of the behavior matches skilled human behavior.
IV. AUTOMOBILE DRIVERS AND ACC DESIGN
Our approach to describing, predicting, and enhancing driver
behavior is to identify the set of skills that automobile drivers
use to safely manage speed and interact with traffic. To manage
speed and interact with traffic, we suppose that drivers use a
set of learned skills [19]. Our approach then identifies how one
skill-based behavior is switched to another and how perceptual
cues trigger such switches. This approach produces a computational model that emulates driver behavior and, by associating
ACC behaviors with a subset of natural driver skills, can be extended to predict how the driver switches between manual and
automated behaviors by detecting and interpreting the operational limits of the automation. These predictions are then supported by experimental results and evidence gathered from relevant literature.
A. Automobile Driving Example
Longitudinal control includes three closed-loop perceptionbased controllers, only one of which is enabled at a time: speed
regulation (SR) wherein the driver regulates speed about a desired value, time headway regulation (TR) wherein the driver

follows another vehicle at a desired time headway, and brake
to avoid collision (BA) wherein the driver reacts to significant
dynamic disturbances such as emergency braking by a lead vehicle.13 Thus, the set of skills relevant to longitudinal vehicle
. The
control (i.e., speed management) are
activities associated with these skills are pressing the brake or
accelerator pedal.
B. Transitions Between ACC and Driver Control
Since we have restricted attention to task automation systems,
we are primarily interested in how the driver can sense when
ACC has reached its operational limits and thus terminates ACC
control. It is useful to associate ACC functions with a subset of
the human driving skills described in the previous section. In the
absence of other traffic, an ACC system regulates speed about
, meaning the ena preset value and thereby, automates
abled skill is speed regulation. In the presence of other traffic,
an ACC system regulates time headway about a preset value
(time headway regulation).
and thereby automates
The transition between these skills, including active braking, is
a critical aspect of ACC usability. Two alternative methods for
such transitions are of importance: engine braking and active
braking. We argue that the active braking skill is distinct from
engine braking, where the former is limited to the BA (braking
active) skill and the latter is used in the TR skill.
1) Hypothesis 1: Based on the assumed perspective that
ACC systems are designed to safely increase comfort, we are
primarily interested in when is such that the ACC is not
. Such an event can occur if either
satisficing,
the ACC system malfunctions or the state of the environment
is outside of the scope of the ACC system. Focusing on the
second occurrence (we will assume that the first occurrence is
negligible—an assumption that must be considered in practice)
our task is to determine the perceptual trigger between satisficing ACC behavior and unacceptable ACC behavior. Since the
limits of ACC behavior as a function of traffic, weather, time
,
of day, and infrastructure correspond to bounds of
this task translates into detecting and interpreting the bounds of
the satisficing set. Hypothesis 1 becomes:
2) Hypothesis 1: Driver Intervention in Task Automation: Assuming receives attention, switches from ACC to
driver control via driver intervention (i.e., forcing ACC to termi.
nate) are easiest for the driver if
In other words, an ACC system that automates both speed and
time headway regulation is most likely to facilitate attentionally
manageable and seamless transitions from automation to human
control. (Note that BA must be performed by the human which
means that the brake is pushed. We restrict attention to systems
where pushing the brakes turns the ACC off, which means that
the driver must turn it back on before the ACC will again affect vehicle behavior.) If Hypothesis 1 holds, then the set of existing perceptual cues used by the driver to detect mandatory
switches to active braking can also be used to detect when the
ACC system should be disengaged (hence a management by ex13We do not consider alternative collision avoidance strategies such as
swerving because these strategies emerge from the interaction between multiple
RB agents. Instead, we leave these areas for future work on the fusion of RB
agent behaviors.
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(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Fig. 3. Comparison of TR/SR domains and ACC domain. (a) TR/SR domain
)
S (TR) S (SR). (b) TR/SR
broader than ACC domain S (u
domain and ACC domain incompatible S (u
) S (TR)
S (SR).
(c) ACC domain broader than TR/SR domain S (u
)
S (TR) S (SR).
(d) ACC domain approximately equals TR/SR domain S (u
)
S (TR) S (SR).



[

[


[
[



ception automation policy is acceptable). If Hypothesis 1 is violated, then drivers require either training or a surrogate system
for detecting a mandatory switch (hence, a management by consent automation policy should be used). Note that this requires
knowledge of a driver’s subjective perceptual boundaries beyond which they actively press the brake (i.e., detection of the
perceptual triggering event). As reported in subsequent sections,
these boundaries are determined by experiment.
3) Alternatives to Hypothesis 1: In Figs. 3(a)–(d) the support for satisficing ACC behavior is shown in relation to the
support for TR, SR, and BA behaviors for three idealized cases.
Compare each of the cases in Figs. 3(a)–(c) to Hypothesis 1 in
Fig. 3(d) wherein the sets overlap. For Fig. 3(a), the ACC system
does not accomplish its stated objective of automating car following and speed regulation behaviors and, consequently, is neither successful from a designer’s perspective nor useful from a
driver’s perspective.
For Fig. 3(b) the set of states for which ACC and TR/SR are
applicable are incompatible. Such a design can either make it
difficult for drivers to intervene in ACC control, or require either
a period of driver adaptation to learn the limits of the new system
or the inclusion of a surrogate system to indicate the limits of
the ACC. For a useful system with a wide range of drivers, it is
undesirable to design the ACC system that requires the driver to
extensively learn and carefully monitor the automation to produce safe automation.
For Fig. 3(c), the ACC system exceeds the driver’s capabilities. Such a system appears attractive in that more driver behaviors than just TR and SR are automated. The problem with this
approach is that the ACC system does not automate all of the
BA skill. By contrast to Fig. 3(d) in which a driver knows when
to brake because the driver has clearly defined boundaries between TR/SR and BA skills, a driver has no such experience in
detecting the limits of ACC behavior. Unless the limits of this
behavior are easily perceived by the driver, such a system can
result in an unsafe ACC design.
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4) Implications From Hypothesis 1: ACC automates two
skills normally performed by automobile drivers: speed regulation and nominal car following. This leaves braking to avoid
collisions and other emergency behaviors to the driver. When
the behavior of an ACC system exceeds the support for SR/TR
skills how do drivers know when to intervene? Provided that
drivers can attend to the perceptual cues, two methods for
detecting the need to intervene are possible. First, drivers can be
trained to learn the perceptual boundary and second, a surrogate
can be used to help the drivers detect the boundary. Since the
people who drive vehicles come from diverse backgrounds
with diverse skills and training, it is unlikely that training will
be universally effective. The second option is to use a surrogate
to assist drivers in detecting the boundary. This not only helps
drivers detect the need to intervene in ACC control, it also
acts to train drivers regarding the limits of ACC behavior.
However, the design of such a surrogate is a nontrivial task as
demonstrated by the difficulty of designing a useful warning
system. Such warning systems must be designed with careful
attention to driver perceptual and information-processing
capabilities. However, a carefully designed surrogate might
increase the safety of any ACC system since Hypothesis 1
is an ideal and difficult to reach in practice. Unfortunately, a
surrogate warning signal that is not aligned with a human’s
natural mental model boundaries may cause a human to adopt
“wait and see” strategy wherein the human waits to intervene
until it is clear that the automation will fail; this can cause delay
in the transition between automation and manual control, and
this is undesirable in safety critical tasks.
C. Automation Dynamics
Since ACC systems produce physical forces on the operator
and require the operator to stay “in the loop”, the way an ACC
system behaves is important. A useful method for assuring that
ACC performance matches human expectations and produces
comfortable execution dynamics is to have the ACC emulate
human operator behavior.
1) Hypothesis 2: Again based on the assumed perspective
that ACC systems are designed to safely increase comfort, we
recognize that ACC systems should be compatible with human
perceptual capabilities and desired comfort. Since automobile
drivers are experienced in regulating speed and time headway,
they have reasonable expectations about the performance of automation. These expectations translate into the statement of Hypothesis 2 as the following:
2) Hypothesis 2: Dynamics of ACC Behavior: Drivers understand and prefer ACC controllers that emulate human perception-based dynamic control.
Because driver’s experience dynamical forces when an ACC
system operates, the ACC needs to be comfortable. This will require some good signal processing and may even require a new
class of sensors. The alternative to this hypothesis is for engineers to design ACC systems that operate in traditional ways
and run the risk of being uncomfortable or unsafe for the average driver. We discuss the consequences of such designs in
the next section.
3) Alternatives to Hypothesis 2: The alternatives to Hypothesis 2 include requiring humans to develop new expectations
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Fig. 4. “Cutting in” problem. The lead vehicle prior and subsequent to the
cut-in event is represented by a shaded box above the ACC vehicle, and an open
box in front of the ACC vehicle, respectively.

of ACC behaviors, or adding information systems that help
human’s understand ACC behaviors. The latter approach requires the same careful analysis of human perceptual abilities,
and will likely shift the operator burden from physical control
to conscious monitoring. Such a shift can produce ironies of
automation and can decrease system safety [1]. The former approach assumes that humans can almost universally learn how a
new system behaves and adjust their thinking to accommodate
this behavior. Not only is this risky from a liability perspective,
it also assumes a great deal about the intended users of the
ACC. It is unlikely that human drivers will be able to suppress
past experiences and always successfully interact with poorly
designed ACC systems, especially in safety critical situations.
4) Implications of Hypothesis 2: The implications of Hypothesis 2 are simple: either translate the vehicle’s raw sensor
data into a perceptual domain and then design a controller for
this domain, or retain a state space description in the sensor domain and then design a controller that emulates human braking
and acceleration.
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE
In this section, we present not only evidence that supports the
multiple mental model framework, but also evidence that supports the two hypotheses. Included in this evidence are results
from relevant literature that supports the human-machine interaction hypotheses.
A. Multiple Mental Models: Experimental Support for
Framework
To test Hypothesis 1, we have gathered evidence from the
transition between speed regulation and active braking. We
present this evidence in this section.
1) Experiment I: Behavioral Quanta and Skill Switches: To
determine SDT-based models of driver behavior, we will focus
on the “cutting in” problem wherein vehicle B cuts in front of
the driver’s vehicle (vehicle A) as diagrammed in Fig. 4. Subsequent to a cut-in event, we refer to the vehicle that cuts in as
and
represent
the lead or cut-in vehicle. In the figure,
the velocities of the driver’s vehicle and the lead vehicle, rerepresents the relative
spectively,
velocity between the vehicles, and represents the range (relative distance) between the vehicles. We define time headway
and
and inverse time to collision, respectively, as
, where
is the speed of the driver’s vehicle, is the relative distance (range) between the driver’s veis the rate of range change (relhicle and a lead vehicle, and

Fig. 5. Actual (dashed line) and approximated (solid line) membership
=
32:5;
=
0:04) and (b) liability
functions: (a) accuracy (
( = 4:9; = 1:10).

0

0

0

ative velocity between the driver’s vehicle and the lead vehicle).
Given these perceptual values, a perceptual state can be defined
.
as
a) Description: Automobile driving is a mix of cognitive
and behavioral skills. When a driver delegates a task to automation, the vehicle assumes responsibility for a behavioral skill.
However, the driver retains (meta) responsibility for detecting
the limits of the automation and responding appropriately. We
conducted an experiment in which human subjects were placed
in a driving simulator14 with a cruise control system engaged. At
random intervals, a vehicle cut in front of the subject’s vehicle
and compelled the subject to determine if the automation can
safely perform the skill or if the driver needed to intervene. Empirical estimates of accuracy and liability can be obtained as described below. Fig. 5 presents the resulting empirical estimates
and the best fit curve to these estimates. Note that, for this ex,
ample, the ecologically valid state variables
(time headway, inverse time-to-collision, and velocity, respectively) suffice to describe the domain of expertise [8]. Data
were partitioned into two classes: active braking (brake pedal
depressed) and nominal behavior (CC engaged, accelerator depressed, or engine braking).
and
, our obb) Empirical Estimates: To identify
jective is to find substates that trigger active braking. We thereand
fore distinguish between nominal behavior
. Our goal is thus to find when
active braking behavior
for
. Nominal operating conditions
occur when the brake pedal is not pressed. For both nominal
and braking conditions, we select representative sample points
from each experimental trial and create two sets of
points: one set for nominal conditions, denoted NOM, and one
set for braking conditions, denoted BRK. For trials when subwhen braking
jects actively brake, the sub-state(s)
is initiated is included in BRK, and the sub-state(s)
14Nissan’s SIRCA simulated driving environment includes approximately six
miles of highway with three lanes in each direction and ambient traffic. In an
experiment using the SIRCA environment, a subject performs lateral control
but engages a cruise control (CC) system to perform longitudinal control about
a preset condition (v = 20 m=s 43 mph). During the experiment, a cut-in
vehicle passes the subject’s vehicle while the CC is engaged and cuts into the
lane with a specified relative velocity v (0) and randomly selected initial time
headway T (0).
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when braking is terminated is included in NOM; for trials when
in the trial
subjects do not brake, the initial sub-state
is included in NOM; and for trials where subjects only brake
(by anticipating the cut-in and then coming to a stop), the initial
in the trial is included in BRK.
sub-state
For notational purposes in the subsequent sections, let
CONDITION denote the cardinality of the
given CONDITION. For example,
set of points
NOM is the number of points in the set
NOM
. Under nominal conditions
NOM ,
relative velocity must be considered acceptable to the driver
under nominal conditions is
hence the distribution of
an observable entity that provides information about what is
is accurate, then
must
accurate. Clearly, if
be at least as accurate. This monotonicity property facilitates
the computation of the accuracy function as the cumulative
distribution function
NOM
NOM
NOM
For classification purposes, we fit (via least squares) a sigma
to
yielding the funcfunction of the form
tion shown in Fig. 5(a).
BRK , time headway values
When braking is initiated
must be considered unacceptable hence the distribution of time
headways when the driver initiates braking is an observable entity that provides information about what is rejectable. Clearly,
is rejectable then
must be at least as reif
jectable. This monotonicity property facilitates the computation
of the liability function as the cumulative distribution function
BRK
BRK
BRK
For classification purposes, we fit (via least squares) a sigma
to
yielding the funcfunction of the form
tion shown in Fig. 5(b).
c) Classification Results: For the driver to switch from
.
one skill to another, it is necessary to identify when
and
from Fig. 5, we can construct the
Using
that support
set of states
nominal behavior, and the set of states
(superscript denotes complement) that do not supand
then
port nominal behavior. If
. Thus, the line
determines
when behavior must be switched from nominal to braking. In
.
other words, the line represents the boundary of
Given the empirically derived membership functions, we can
determine the boundary between nominal and braking behaviors as a function of by finding the perceptual states for
. This is illustrated in Fig. 6 for
which
the data gathered in the simulator experiment, where indicates
NOM and indicates
BRK. To the northwest of the
line, BA is satisficing but TR and SR are not, and to the southeast of the line TR and SR (and, perhaps, BA) are satisficing.
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Fig. 6.

Scatter plot of nominal and braking perceptual states.

Classification can be performed by finding the value of that
optimally separates braking from nominal behavior. The value
is the minimax value over percent misclassifications,
percent false alarms, and percent missed detections and indicates that over 85% of samples are correctly classified.
2) Experiment II: Behavioral Quanta and Skill
Switches: Because Experiment I relied on a fixed-base
driving simulator, there is some question about how these
results relate to situated driving in real vehicles. To test the
transfer of these results to driving, a second experiment was
conducted with professional drivers responding to unpredictable cut-in events with real vehicles on a test track. In the
experiment, two vehicles drive in the same lane on a closed
test track. The subject drives vehicle A which follows vehicle
B. The drivers in vehicles A and B are required to maintain an
and
until a chime rings in vehicle
assigned speed
A’s car. When the chime rings, the driver of vehicle A is to
establish a natural following distance (i.e., drive as if vehicle B
had just cut-in to vehicle A’s lane) while vehicle B maintains a
, brake pressure,
constant speed. Measurements include
and throttle opening angle. Time headway and time to collision
were computed from these measurements. A complete description of this experiment can be found in [10]. To perform the
and
were estimated, and the
classification,
that minimizes the misclassification error was determined. The
results indicate one false alarm and no missed detections.
B. Transitions: Experimental Support for Hypothesis 1
We now turn attention to experimental evidence that indicates
what is an acceptable termination policy, and what is not acceptable.
1) Cruise Control: Cruise control systems have been used
in vehicles for many years. The continued installation of these
systems not only attests to their usefulness in increasing driving
comfort, but also demonstrates that drivers can safely detect
perceptually triggering events and intervene to avoid collisions.
Furthermore, we have performed experiments in which we have
identified the perceptual triggering events and interpreted these
events as natural transitions from the speed-regulation driver
skill to either time-headway or collision-avoidance driver skills
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(see Section V.A and [8], [12]). We thereby conclude that attentive drivers can appropriately interpret perceptual triggering
events and intervene when situations arise beyond the intended
limits of automation. Furthermore, we suggest that attention to
relevant perceptual cues is facilitated by the requirement that
drivers must continue to steer the vehicle. This prevents the
driver from excessively diverting attention from the driving task.
Since attention is given to relevant perceptual cues and since
perceptual triggering events can be interpreted, we conclude the
cruise control automation technology is sufficient to justify a
management by exception automation policy.
2) Advanced Cruise Control: Consider the results from
[23] wherein an ACC system that included a limited amount
of active braking was studied. Among other things, the study
reported that ACC users have “too large (of) expectations”
about ACC abilities, most ACC users waited to intervene until
a warning was received, and collisions that occurred (in the
driving simulator) when the ACC was engaged “could (not)
by decreased level of driver alertness” (which
be explained
may not hold when drivers are not engaged in an experimental
study). The first two of these findings suggest that when an
ACC system does more than automate TR and SR skills, then
drivers have a difficult time safely detecting the limits of the
ACC system (there is no natural switch between skills). Instead,
drivers sometimes adopt a “wait and see attitude” that allows
the ACC system to reach its limits rather than proactively
intervening to avoid an unsafe situation. The last finding
suggests that the negative effects of ACC behavior cannot be
entirely attributed to not attending to .

Fig. 7. Perceptual phase plane trajectories for professional driver one with
initial conditions (T (0); v (0)) (1 s; 20 km=hr).



Fig. 8. Perceptual phase trajectory of unacceptable automated performance
with initial conditions (T (0); v (0)) (1 s; 0 km=hr).



C. Dynamics: Experimental Support for Hypothesis 2
We now present evidence that suggests that when Hypothesis
2 is violated, the resulting performance of an ACC system is unacceptable or unnatural. Additionally, this evidence supports the
claim that people use perceptual cues to perform manual control
in automobile driving. We refer the reader to other work on perception-based control in [4], [6], [10], [18] for further evidence,
including a correlation analysis and nonlinear regression analysis of the variables used to control braking.
1) Description: Two elementary PD controller were developed and tested in various cut-in scenarios. These PD controllers
operated on the error between estimated range and desired
, where computation of
from
is a conrange
. Instrucession to technological constraints on estimating
mented vehicle were then equipped with the controllers, and the
behaviors of the controllers were compared to the behaviors of
professional drivers who were placed in similar situations using
the experimental set-up described in Section V.A2.
2) Results: The data are classified into two categories: those
for which active braking occurs and those for which no such
braking occurs, indicated in Figs. 7–9 with a and a , respectively. The sequence of ’s present after the cut-in event indicate
the amount of time taken to react to the cut-in event. It is helpful
to illustrate the perceptual phase plane trajectories subsequent to
the cut-in event for each data class (time histories can be found
in [10]).
From the experimental data, four observations are apparent
and worth noting. First, the decision to brake is made (ignoring

Fig. 9. Perceptual phase trajectory of unacceptable automated performance
with initial conditions (T (0); v (0)) (1 s; 60 km=hr).



reaction time) when
. Conversely, a driver
. Thus, diis likely to accelerate when
viding driver behavior into active braking and nominal (not-active) braking produces a division roughly at
. Second, when
, the factor determining dynamic
driver behavior appears to be related to time headway. This
is observable from the driver response in Fig. 7 wherein the
driver first establishes zero relative velocity (and infinite time
to collision) and then appears to regulate vehicle speed around
s. Third, drivers establish
the time headway value
) behavior at different values of
.
steady-state (i.e.,
difference between
There is a significant
subjects who participated in the experiment. For subject A the
, and for subject B the
mean terminal headway is
. Interestingly, there are
mean terminal headway is
differences for different
no significant within subject
or
conditions. Thus, we find evidence that
influences
braking dynamics independently of . Our conclusion is that

GOODRICH AND BOER: MODEL-BASED HUMAN-CENTERED TASK AUTOMATION

driver’s use time headway and time to collision as speed-independent variables for controlling the dynamics of braking as
well as the set point for car following. Fourth, the characteristics of the phase plane trajectory influence the acceptability of
the automated performance. As shown in Fig. 7, people establish natural following distances by generating counterclockwise
trajectories in perceptual space. By contrast, automated controllers that fail to follow this counterclockwise trajectory are
judged unacceptable by subjects. In the data shown in Fig. 8,
the test driver reported that the performance was unacceptable
because the braking action was too extreme given that the relative velocity, though positive, was small in magnitude. This
“hard-braking plus low relative velocity” characteristic is manifest as an unacceptable clockwise trajectory in the perceptual
phase plane. Additionally, as shown in Fig. 9, not only must
perceptual trajectories be counterclockwise they must also be
smooth. When trajectories are not smooth, subjects report a period of rapid braking followed by a coasting interval which was
then followed by another braking interval. This surge, though
moderate, reportedly felt awkward and unnatural and is unacceptable.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
A human centered approach to designing automation is introduced and motivated through a case study of automated car following systems. The fundamental design principle is to use the
human operator as a template for automation. A model of how
operators perform various tasks is required if a template-based
approach to human-centered design is to be successful. This
model can be used to identify sub-components of a particular
task that are characterized by a region in perceptual state space
and a corresponding behavioral skill. As the perceptual state
(e.g., vehicle, environment, and/or traffic) changes from one
skill domain to another, operators switch skills. These skills are
characterized by
1) perceptual variables used to perform skilled perceptual
motor control;
2) perceptual variables used to decide when to initiate and
terminate the skill;
3) understanding of how operators evaluate performance;
4) understanding of what control strategy operators adopt.
For example, drivers switch from speed regulation skill to car
following skill depending on the time headway and time to collision to a preceding vehicle. It is hypothesized that automation of
these easily identifiable sub-components has several advantages
over approaches based on other criteria (e.g., technological feasibility). We provide experimental support for the hypotheses
that such a human centered approach
1) improves detection of nonsupported situations;
2) improves evaluation of system performance;
3) facilitates development of a proper level of trust;
4) improves ability to take over control;
5) theoretically enhances safety.
Skilled operator behavior can be organized into behavioral
quanta that correspond to separate skill-based behaviors. For
longitudinal control of an automobile, such skills include
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following a lead vehicle, braking to avoid a collision, and regulating speed about a desired value. When automation is added
to a vehicle, some of these skill-based behaviors are performed
automatically by the vehicle itself. By measuring human subjects’ responses to cut-in events in both driving simulator and
test track studies, we have presented experimental support that
natural boundaries exist between automated speed regulation
(conventional cruise control) and skill-based braking behaviors.
These experimental results are described in the theoretical
and computational framework provided by using satisficing
decision theory to describe switches between multiple mental
models. Extending these results to ACC systems we hypothesize that, assuming an attentive driver, switches from ACC
to driver control (via driver intervention) are easiest if the
operational limits of ACC behavior correspond to the natural
boundaries between that of the speed-regulation/car-following
skill-based behaviors and that of the active braking skill-based
behavior. We conclude that advanced vehicle system design
can benefit from careful analysis of driver behavior by producing systems with an operational domain that is assessable
by human drivers. We further conclude that the analysis of
human-vehicle interaction can be systematically performed
using a satisficing-based description of multiple mental model
dynamics.
Through learning, adaptation, and optimization, operators
have identified the most informative signals as input and have
established performance criteria that produce behaviors that
have proven to result in a satisficing tradeoff between various
driver needs (e.g., expediency, safety, and comfort). Utilizing
this knowledge in the design of automation is one step toward
successful human-centered automation, but much work still
needs to be done since modeling human behaviors in complex
systems is still very challenging.
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